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INTRODUCTION 
Large institutions such as banks, franchisers, international compa­
nies, and lessors distrust juries' ability to properly resolve disputes and 
award reasonable damages. As a result, these and other actors have 
attempted to limit juries' potential influence on the contracts to which 
they are parties. They have done so through contractual jury trial 
waiver clauses1 in these agreements.2 
* The author would like to thank University of Michigan Law School professors 
Richard Friedman and Samuel Gross for their thoughtful ideas, and the Michigan Law 
Review editors and staff, in particular Sean Lewis and John McNichols, for their editorial 
wisdom. 
1. These contractual waivers occasionally exist concurrently with mandatory binding 
arbitration agreements, but often they exist independently. This Note will not tackle the 
issue of arbitration agreements and jury trial waivers. For scholarship on that complicated 
topic, see Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000); David S. 
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights 
Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; Jean R. Sternlight, 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury 
Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 691 (2001) [hereinafter Sternlight, Mandatory 
Binding Arbitration] (discussing the Seventh Amendment jury trial waiver standard as appli­
cable to both jury trial waivers and arbitration agreements); and Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea 
or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996). 
2. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(equipment-lease agreement); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 
104 
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The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the jury 
trial right.3 Whether the right is determined to exist in an individual 
instance is a matter of federal common law,4 which merely preserves 
the jury trial right as it existed when the Amendment was adopted in 
1791.5 Although the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a 
1985) (lending agreement); Nat'! Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 
1977) (equipment-lease agreement); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 
(N.D. Tex. 2002) (debt guarantee); Efficient Solutions, Inc. v. Meiners' Country Mart, Inc., 
56 F. Supp. 2d 982, 938 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (master-service agreement); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. 
Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. P.R. 1996) (lien agreement); Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. 
Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev. 1994) (lending agreement), aff d, 89 F.3d 
846 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion); Bonfield v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. 
Supp. 589, 594-96 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (franchise agreement); Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics 
Corp., No. CIV.A.85-1788, 1989 WL 159267, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989) (construction 
contract); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982) 
(dealer agreement). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment states: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined 
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Id. For a brief history of the ratification of the Amendment, see Edith Guild Henderson, The 
Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966). 
4. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 221 (1963) (per curium); see also Minneapolis & St. 
Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (holding that the Seventh Amendment 
does not apply to the states). 
5. Courts apply a historical analysis to determine whether the jury trial right would have 
existed in eighteenth-century England. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-21 (1987). 
Hence, a jury trial right exists only when the dispute, viewed in this historical context, would 
have been heard by a jury at common law. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2301, at 14-15 (2d ed. 1994). No right ex­
ists when the dispute would have been tried in the courts of equity. Id. Since the merger of 
law and equity in 1938, courts must determine which claims are legal and which are equitable 
by looking to 1791 English custom and the remedy sought. See FED. R. Clv. P. 2; Baltimore 
& Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. 
Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830); see also 
Groome v. Steward, 142 F.2d 756, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (stating that this is the only area in 
which the distinction between law and equity has any further procedural significance); Note, 
The Effect of the Merger of Law and Equity on the Right of the Jury Trial in Federal Courts, 
36 GEO. L.J. 666, 666 (1948). 
This approach has been the accepted interpretation of the Seventh Amendment 
beginning with Justice Story's 1812 opinion on circuit in United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 
745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812), when he stated: 
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the common law of any individ­
ual state (for it probably differs in all), but it is the common law of England, the grand reser­
voir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for me to expound the grounds of this 
opinion, because they must be obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the 
law. 
The historical approach is the primary test for determining whether the jury trial right 
exists, but is not rigidly followed. Lower courts have developed many procedures for 
checking jury abuses, yet the Court has found them all to be consistent with the Seventh 
Amendment. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (nonmutual col­
lateral estoppel); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943) (directed verdict); 
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (rernittitur); Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Ref. 
Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931) (retrial limited to the question of damages); Fid. & Deposit 
Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902) (summary judgment). 
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jury trial, it does not mandate one. As with other constitutional rights, 
this right may be waived.6 
For those issues that may go to a jury, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure ("FRCP") 38 creates a procedure for demanding or waiving 
the jury trial right.7 FRCP 38 establishes a bright-line rule that places 
the demand burden on the party seeking a jury trial.8 That is, a litigant 
must specifically demand a jury trial, and if she does not, she waives 
this right. In addition to this passive waiver procedure, a litigant may 
also actively waive her jury trial right by contract in anticipation of po­
tential litigation.9 
In disputes over whether a jury trial has been passively waived 
under FRCP 38, the Rule clearly provides where the burden of proof 
in demanding a jury trial lies: the burden is placed on the party 
seeking the jury trial right to demonstrate she has not waived this 
right. 10 The placement of this burden is not so clear for contractual 
6. See Kearney v. Case, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 275, 281 (1870); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819). 
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 38. The complete text of FRCP 38, Jury Trial of Right, reads as fol­
lows: 
(a) Rights Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh 
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United 
States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of 
right by a jury by (1) serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in 
writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later 
than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue, 
and (2) filing the demand as required by Rule 5(d). Such demand may be 
indorsed upon a pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: Specification of Issues. In the demand a party may specify the 
issues which the party wishes so tried; otherwise the party shall be 
deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable. If the 
party has demanded trial by jury for only some of the issues, any other 
party within 10 days after service of the demand or such lesser time as the 
court may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all 
of the issues of fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve and file a demand as required by 
this rule constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury. A demand for 
trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the 
consent of the parties. 
(e) Admiralty and Maritime Claims. These rules shall not be construed to 
create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime 
claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h). 
8. Id. 
9. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Wynne, 126 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1942). 
IO. A party who makes a prompt demand pursuant to FRCP 38(b) is entitled to a jury 
trial as a matter of right. See, e.g., Previn v. Bare!!, 14 F.R.D. 466, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 1953). 
Courts determine whether the Rule's "technical requirements" - proper service and filing 
- have been fulfilled "with an eye toward fairness." Wauhop v. Allied Humble Bank, 926 
F.2d 454, 455 (5th Cir. 1991). If a party fails to demand a jury trial pursuant to Rule 38(b), 
Rule 39(b) allows the court discretion to grant a jury trial notwithstanding the party's failure 
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jury trial waivers. The issue of where to place the burden is ultimately 
a conflict between two asserted rights: the Seventh Amendment and 
the freedom of contract. On one hand, the Seventh Amendment guar­
antees the right to a jury trial.1 1  Courts that place the burden on the 
party seeking enforcement of the contractual waiver value the funda­
mental jury trial right over the liberty of contract.12 They ground their 
holdings on the jury trial right's hallowed place among the Bill of 
Rights and the Supreme Court's declaration of the right as fundamen­
tal, 13 relying heavily on the Court's statement in Aetna Insurance Co. 
v. Kennedy14 that "as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. "15 On the other 
hand, individuals have the right to freely and mutually enter into 
contracts.16 Courts that have placed the burden on the party seeking to 
avoid enforcement appear to value liberty of contract over the right to 
a jury trial.17 Instead of indulging a presumption against waiver, these 
courts hold there should be a presumption in favor of the validity of 
such a waiver contract.18 
Although nearly every federal circuit has addressed the issue of 
burden placement in contractual jury trial waiver disputes, their opin-
to make timely demand. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(b). The burden of convincing the court to exer­
cise such discretion is placed on the demanding party. See Local 783, Allied Indus. Workers 
of Am., AFL-CIO v. Gen. Elec. Co., 471 F.2d 751, 754 (6th Cir. 1973); Bloch v. 
Fishman, 610 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Wis. 1985). 
11. See supra note 3. 
12. See, e.g., Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., No. CIV.A.85-1788, 1989 WL 
159267, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989) ("[A]lthough there is a compelling interest in the 
preservation of the freedom to contract, there is an even greater interest in guarding the 
fundamental right to a jury."). 
13. For the leading cases in these circuits, see infra note 19. See also Aetna Ins. Co. v. 
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 ("A waiver is ordi­
narily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."); Ohio 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) ("We do not presume acquies­
cence in the loss of fundamental rights."); Dimick v. Schied!, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) 
("Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a 
place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial 
should be scrutinized with the utmost care."). 
14. Aetna, 301 U.S. 389 (1937). 
15. Id. at 393; see also Roell v. Withrow, 123 S. Ct. 1696, 1706 (2003) (Thomas, J., dis­
senting) (quoting Aetna). 
16. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1977) (protecting the right of all citizens to make and en­
force contracts); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 n.38 (1981) (interpreting 42 
U.S.C. § 1981); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the liberty guaran­
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes "the right of the individual to contract"). 
17. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985) (im­
plying as such by placing the burden on the objecting party "in the context of an express 
contractual waiver."). 
18. See id. (relying on MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, which instructs the court to "start 
with a presumption in favor of validity in the interest of liberty of contract." 5 JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 'll 38.46, at 428-39 (2d ed. 1984)). 
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ions have included minimal thoughtful analysis.19 Federal courts 
generally recognize contractual jury waivers as valid if they were vol­
untary and knowing;20 however, courts disagree as to who bears the 
burden of proving or disproving the waiver's validity. Currently, seven 
federal circuits place the burden of proving that a contractual jury trial 
waiver was voluntary and knowing on the party seeking to enforce the 
waiver.21 The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, places the burden on 
the party seeking a jury trial in contravention of the waiver.22 
19. The leading cases in each circuit are as follows: 
A First Circuit district court, addressing the validity of a jury trial waiver provision in a 
lien agreement, stated only that "even though the First Circuit has not expressed an opinion 
as to this matter, we are persuaded that the burden of proving the waiver of such a funda­
mental right properly rests upon the party seeking to enforce such a waiver." Luis Acosta, 
Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. P.R. 1996). 
In a Second Circuit case involving an equipment lease containing a jury trial waiver 
provision, the court noted that the jury trial right is fundamental and that a presumption ex­
ists against its waiver. Nat'! Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Although it did not state as such, by implication the court placed the burden of proving that 
the waiver was signed intentionally and knowingly on the lessor, the party seeking waiver 
enforcement. See id. 
In a Third Circuit commercial contract dispute where one party waived its jury trial 
right, a district court, in an unpublished opinion, placed the burden of proving the validity of 
the waiver on the party seeking enforcement, relying on the "great[] interest in guarding the 
fundamental right to a jury." Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., No. CIV.A.85-1788, 
1989 WL 159267, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989). 
In a Fourth Circuit case involving an equipment lease where the lessees waived their jury 
trial right, the court stated only that "where waiver is claimed under a contract executed 
before litigation is contemplated, we agree with those courts that have held that the party 
seeking enforcement of the waiver must prove that consent was both voluntary and 
informed." Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986). 
A Fifth Circuit district court, addressing the validity of a jury waiver clause in a guaranty, 
concluded, without stating a reason, that the party seeking enforcement bears the burden. 
RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002). 
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue in the context of a lending agreement containing a 
jury waiver clause and stated only that "in the context of an express contractual waiver the 
objecting party should have the burden of demonstrating that its consent to the provisions 
was not knowing and voluntary." K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758. 
In a Ninth Circuit case involving a loan agreement containing a jury trial waiver, a dis­
trict court, with no analysis other than chronicling what the majority of courts have held, 
placed the burden on the lender, the party seeking waiver enforcement. Phoenix Leasing 
Inc. v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev. 1994), aff d, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 
1996) (unpublished opinion). 
Finally, a Tenth Circuit district court addressing the validity of a jury waiver in a dealer 
agreement noted the "strong presumption" in favor of jury trials, thus placing the burden on 
the party seeking enforcement. See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 
402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982). 
20. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258. Some courts use different but similar elements. See, e.g., 
Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (knowing and volun­
tary); Nat'! Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(voluntary and intentional); Smyly v. Hyundai Motor Am., 762 F. Supp. 428, 429 (D. Mass. 
1991) (knowing and intentional). 
21. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits place the burden 
in this manner. For the leading cases in each circuit, see supra note 20. 
22. See K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758; Efficient Solutions, Inc. v. Meiners' Country Mart, Inc., 
56 F. Supp. 2d 982, 983 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). 
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Among courts that adopt the majority position - those that place 
the burden on the party seeking to enforce the jury trial waiver -
most simply conclude that the court is persuaded, without analysis, 
that the burden should be placed on the party seeking to uphold the 
waiver.23 Several courts note the jury trial right as fundamental, or 
note the presumption in favor of jury trials as espoused in Aetna.24 
Some merely point to what the majority of courts have held and hold 
likewise.25 Most, however, offer no justification whatsoever for where 
they place the burden, or what that burden actually entails.26 More 
importantly for this Note, no court in the majority has actually ana­
lyzed what Aetna's "every reasonable presumption" means in concrete 
terms, or how the specific facts in Aetna inform the analysis . Also, no 
court has been explicit about whether a presumption shifts any or all 
three of the burdens of proof: pleading, production, and persuasion.27 
The Sixth Circuit, which places the burden of proof on the party 
seeking to void the waiver, engages in more analysis of the issue than 
courts in the majority of circuits, but its analysis suffers from similar 
shortcomings.28 Its cases note a presumption in favor of liberty of 
contract, but they fail to explain what that presumption entails or how 
it comports with the presumption against waivers.29 
23. See, e.g., Crane, 804 F.2d at 833; Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258; Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 
813; Luis Acosta, 920 F. Supp. at 18; Phoenix Leasing, 843 F. Supp. at 1384; Hydramar, 1989 
WL 159267, at *2; Dreiling, 539 F. Supp. at 403. 
24. See, e.g., Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258; Luis Acosta, 920 F. Supp. at 18; Hydramar, 1989 
WL 159267, at *2; Dreiling, 539 F. Supp. at 403. 
25. See, e.g., Crane, 804 F.2d at 833; Phoenix Leasing, 843 F. Supp. at 1384. 
26. See, e.g., Crane, 804 F.2d at 833; Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258; Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 
813; Luis Acosta, 920 F. Supp. at 18; Phoenix Leasing, 843 F. Supp. at 1384, aff d, 89 F.3d 846 
(9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion). 
27. See infra text regarding presumptions and shifting of the burdens of proof accompa­
nying notes 39-44. 
28. In a Sixth Circuit suit between a borrower and a lender for breach of a financial 
agreement, K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985), where the 
contractual agreement contained a jury trial waiver, the court relied on MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE for its holding, which states in part: 
In determining whether to give effect to the contractual waiver against an objecting party, 
the court should start with a presumption in favor of validity in the interest of liberty of 
contract. This would require the objecting party to point to some one or more matters that 
render the provision improper. 
5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 'II 38.46, at 428-39 (2d ed. 
1984). The court agreed and held that in the context of contractual jury trial waivers, the 
objecting party should bear the burden. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758. In a district court 
master-service agreement and supplemental-contract dispute, the waiving party argued that 
the waiver was not knowing and voluntary because the provision was not "sufficiently 
conspicuous." Efficient Solutions, Inc. v. Meiners' Country Mart, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 982, 
983 (W.D. Tenn. 1999). Citing K.M.C., the court concluded that "when a contract contains 
an express jury waiver provision, the party objecting to that provision has the burden of 
demonstrating that its consent to the waiver was not knowing and voluntary." Id. 
29. See, e.g., K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758. 
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Observing this split, one is still left with the impression that courts 
on either side have yet to truly tackle the burdens of proof and 
presumption issues.30 This is understandable.31 Courts have used the 
term presumption in a dizzying array of ways,32 and unlike the courts 
interpreting the Aetna language seem to suggest,33 there is clearly no 
one definition of the term. It is also clear that not all of the uses of the 
term necessarily entail a shift in one of the burdens of proof.34 Thus, 
given the lack of analysis by courts on either side of the split, and 
given the incredible confusion generally on the use of the term 
presumption, this Note employs the most systematic of available 
approaches.35 It draws on the framework of evidentiary presumptions 
and the six presumption types catalogued by scholars36 to decipher 
Aetna's "every reasonable presumption" language.37 Only by doing 
30. In the area of presumptions, an observer understandably would be pessimistic. As 
one legal scholar once observed, "[T]he doctrine of presumptions is clouded with difficulties 
and leads to much vain speculation and logical unrealism." JOHN H. WIGMORE , A 
STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 454 (1935). Another noted that every 
writer who has tried to make sense of presumptions "has left . . .  with a feeling of despair." 
Edmund M. Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255 (1937). 
31. One scholar recently wrote that "[t]he legal term 'presumption' confuses almost 
everyone who has ever thought about it. That confusion is fully justified. Not only are the 
concepts represented by the term complex, but courts and legislatures have used the term in 
many different and often inconsistent ways." Kenneth S. Broun, The Unfulfillable Promise 
of One Rule for All Presumptions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 697 (1984). 
32. See generally Broun, supra note 32. 
33. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986); Nat'! Equip. 
Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 
F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15, 
18 (D. P.R. 1996); Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev. 
1994), aff d, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion). 
34. See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, Presumptions: 350 Years of Confusion and It Has Come 
to This, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 383 (1992). In this article, the author catalogues every use of 
the term presumption by Nebraska courts. Amazingly, he includes the following varied uses, 
not all of which entail a burden shift: presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion; 
Nebraska common-law presumptions that shift the burden of production; legally permissible 
inferences from relevant evidence; and rules of law (including so-called "irrebuttable" 
presumptions, rules establishing who has the initial burden of proof regarding each essential 
element of each issue in a case, rules governing statutory interpretation, rules governing the 
interpretation of legal documents, and constitutional presumptions). 
35. For the only other work in addition to this Note analyzing the circuit split, see 
Deborah J. Matties, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial 
Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431 (1997). The author takes the majority 
view and argues that courts should make waiving one's right to a jury trial as difficult as pos­
sible, thus placing the burden on the party seeking enforcement. For lists of cases and sum­
maries without analysis of the split, see David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by 
Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of 
Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1119 (2002); Sternlight, Mandatory 
Binding Arbitration, supra note 1; Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Contractual Jury Waivers in 
Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.LR. FED. 688 § 4, at 695-97 (1989). 
36. See infra notes 47-52. 
37. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 292, 393 (1937). 
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this can one analyze the use of the presumption term in Aetna to 
determine, in a more logical way than the courts have done, if a 
burden should be shifted, and if so, which one.38 
This Note argues that in the case of federal contractual jury trial 
waiver disputes, courts should adhere only to a permissive presump­
tion in favor of jury trials. Part I contends that Aetna is best under­
stood as establishing a permissive presumption rather than a manda­
tory burden-of-production-shifting presumption. Part II argues that 
multiple policy reasons weigh in favor of adhering to a permissive pre­
sumption rather than a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting pre­
sumption. 
I. AETNA INSURANCE CO. V. KENNEDY ESTABLISHES A 
NON-BURDEN-SHIFrING PERMISSIVE PRESUMPTION 
The law imposes three burdens that a party must satisfy to prove 
its case.39 The first is the burden of pleading, or convincing the court 
that one has sufficiently stated a claim for relief under the law based 
on the alleged factual assertions.40 The second is the burden of produc­
tion, where one party must demonstrate sufficient evidence to allow a 
factfinder to find in that party's favor.41 The third is the burden of per­
suasion, where one party must convince the factfinder of some propo­
sition in order to render a verdict for that party.42 The party initiating 
the suit or seeking a change in the status quo usually bears these three 
burdens;43 however, legislatures and courts occasionally shift one or 
more of the burdens, usually for public policy reasons.44 
Presumptions are one way for legislatures and courts to shift 
burdens. In evidentiary terms, they essentially allow the factfinder to 
presume that a fact is true if some predicate fact is shown.45 That is, if 
38. Scholarly articles and other secondary sources have also failed to analyze the Aetna 
statement in terms of presumption categories or the three separate burdens. See Matties, 
supra note 35; 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury §§ 72, 76 (2003); 50A C.J.S. Juries § 184 (2002) (citing 
without analysis only New York state case law to conclude that the party seeking waiver 
should bear the burden). 
39. For general introductions to the three burdens making up the burden of proof, see 
RICHARD 0. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1235-47 (3d ed. 
2000); and STEPHEN c. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 719-22 (5th ed. 2000). 
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 190 (7th ed. 1999). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. In civil cases, the plaintiff's burden is usually by a preponderance of the evidence; 
in criminal cases, the prosecution's burden is beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
43. LEMPERT ET AL, supra note 39, at 1236. 
44. Id. at 1237. 
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (7th ed. 1999) ("presumption[:] A legal inference 
or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact 
or group of facts."). 
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the predicate fact A is proved, then the fact B is presumed to follow. 
The type of presumption being used determines how strong the 
connection must be from A to B. 
Evidence scholars catalogue six presumption types, not all of 
which shift a burden:46 permissive inferences;47 permissive presump­
tions;48 mandatory burden-of-pleading-shifting presumptions;49 manda­
tory burden-of-production-shifting presumptions;50 mandatory burden­
of-persuasion-shifting presumptions;51 and conclusive presumptions.52 
Although Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 301 provides a default 
rule for presumptions in federal court,53 it is used only when the law 
creating the presumption does not specify its effect.54 
The majority of circuits that have placed the burden of proof in 
contractual jury trial waiver disputes on the party seeking to uphold 
the waiver have done so by relying on the Supreme Court's statement 
in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy that "courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver."55 No court, however, has 
actually investigated the facts and holding of Aetna, nor has any court 
parsed the words in this quote to determine the precise nature of this 
46. This Note borrows heavily from and thus follows the categorization developed in 
LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 39 (six presumption categories). For other categorizations, see 
Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, S2 MICH. L. REV. 
19S, 196-209 (19S3) (eight presumption categories); and Edmund M. Morgan, Further 
Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 24S, 247-49 (1943) (seven presumption 
categories). 
47. If the party proves A, then the factfinder may find B when A is considered along 
with all evidence. 
48. If the party proves A, then the factfinder may find B even if A is the only evidence. 
49. If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party 
claims B is not true. 
SO. If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party 
introduces evidence sufficient to prove B is not true. Sufficient evidence may be defined as 
any evidence, reasonable evidence, or substantial evidence. 
Sl. If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party 
persuades the factfinder that B is not true. Persuasion may be defined anywhere from a 
preponderance to beyond a reasonable doubt. 
S2. If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B. Conclusive presumptions are 
probably better understood as rules of law, since they cannot be rebutted. See RICHARD 
EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY 92 (1978); WJGMORE, supra note 31. 
S3. FED. R. Evm. 301. FRE 301 reads as follows: 
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by 
these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of 
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such 
party the burden of proof . . .  which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it 
was originally cast. 
S4. FRE 301 may be relevant since the contractual jury trial waiver disputes at issue 
take place in federal court. 
SS. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 292, 393 (1937); see also supra note 20. 
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presumption.56 This Part examines Aetna and argues that even if it ap­
pears to establish a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting 
presumption when limited to its own facts (a situation that did not 
involve a contract· dispute), when applied to a contractual jury trial 
waiver dispute, it establishes only a permissive presumption. This Part 
further contends that the Sixth Circuit is correct in holding that the 
burden of proof should not be shifted from the party seeking to avoid 
the waiver. 
The question presented in Aetna to the Supreme Court was 
"[w]hether, by their request for directed verdicts, the parties waived 
their right to trial by jury."57 At trial, plaintiff Bogash (who had ac­
quired Kennedy's interest) and defendant Aetna Insurance Co., hav­
ing introduced their evidence and agreed upon the amount of loss sus­
tained, both submitted requests for peremptory-jury instructions and 
for a directed verdict in their respective favor.58 The district court re­
fused both sides' requests and submitted the case to the jury.59 The 
jury found for Aetna, and Bogash appealed.60 The circuit court of ap­
peals held that the district court erred in refusing to charge the jury on 
Bogash's requested instructions, reversed, and ordered a new trial.61 
On Bogash's application for rehearing, however, the appeals court 
held that "by their requests for peremptory instructions, plaintiff and 
defendants assumed the facts to be undisputed and submitted to the 
trial judge the determination of the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence and so took the cases from the jury."62 The court denied the 
request for rehearing and remanded the case to the district court with 
directions to give judgment to Bogash in the amount of the agreed 
upon loss.63 
The majority of circuits have relied almost exclusively upon 
Aetna's language that "as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts 
56. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1986); K.M.C. Co., Inc. 
v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Nat'! Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811 (N.D. Tex. 
2002); Efficient Solutions, Inc. v. Meiners' Country Mart, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1999); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F. Supp. 15 (D. P.R. 1996); Phoenix 
Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Nev. 1994), atfd, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 
1996) (unpublished opinion); Bonfield v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989); Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., No. CIV.A.85-1788, 1989 WL 159267 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 
1982). 
57. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 392-93. 
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indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" in determining 
where to place the burden of proof in contractual jury trial waiver 
disputes.64 That language originates from the following holding: 
The established rule is that where plaintiff and defendant respectively 
request peremptory instructions, and do nothing more, they thereby 
assume the facts to be undisputed and in effect submit to the trial judge 
the determination of the inferences properly to be drawn from them. 
And upon review a finding of fact by the trial court under such circum­
stances must stand if the record discloses substantial evidence to support 
it. But, as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge every rea­
sonable presumption against waiver. And unquestionably the parties re­
spectively may request a peremptory instruction and, upon refusal of the 
court to direct a verdict, have submitted to the jury all issues as to which 
opposing inferences may be drawn from the evidence. Here neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendants applied for directed verdicts without more. 
With their requests for peremptory instructions they submitted other re­
quests that reasonably may be held to amount to applications that, if a 
peremptory instruction were not given, the cases be submitted to the 
jury.65 
Analyzed in terms of evidentiary presumptions, Aetna's language 
does appear to create some type of burden-shifting presumption for 
jury trial waiver disputes.66 Here, both parties to the suit claimed the 
same thing (that they requested more than just directed verdicts), 
while the trial court "claimed" that they waived their jury trial right; 
the appellate court is deciding the dispute.67 Thus, in effect, the 
"party" benefiting from any presumption is actually both parties to the 
litigation, the "opposing party" is the trial judge, and the "factfinder" 
is the appellate court. In terms of the previous catalogue of presump­
tions, the predicate fact A is a request for more than a directed ver­
dict, and the presumed fact Bis not waiving the jury trial.68 
With this in mind, one can survey the six presumption types and 
find the appropriate match. The permissive inference and permissive 
presumption fail to fit the situation. Both ignore the trial judge's 
conclusions,69 contrary to Aetna's holding.70 These presumptions 
permit the factfinder to find the presumed fact B without any 
64. Id. at 393. 
65. Id. at 393-94 (footnotes omitted). 
66. Note that Aetna does provide some explanation for the presumption. Since FRE 301 
is a default rule that only applies when the law creating the presumption does not specify its 
effect, one cannot rely upon it in this case. See FED. R. EVID. 301; see also supra text accom­
panying notes 53-54. 
67. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 391-94. 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47. 
69. See supra notes 48-49. 
70. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 394. 
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reference whatsoever to the opposing party (here, the trial judge ).71 
But Aetna clearly references the trial judge, stating that his decision 
"must stand if the record discloses substantial evidence."72 
The mandatory burden-of-pleading-shifting presumption also fails. 
It grants the trial judge too much power, since he need only claim that 
there was a waiver.73 Under this presumption, the factfinder must find 
the presumed fact B, unless the opposing party merely claims B is not 
true.74 This again runs contrary to Aetna's statement that the trial 
judge's decision stands only if supported by "substantial evidence."75 
The mandatory burden-of-persuasion-shifting presumption does 
not appear applicable either. Aetna discusses sufficiency of supporting 
evidence in the record,76 not adequacy of persuasion on the part of the 
trial judge.77 
Finally, the conclusive presumption is too strong. It requires the 
factfinder to find the presumed fact B if the predicate fact A is 
proven.78 In Aetna's case, the appellate court would be required to find 
B (no waiver) if the parties prove A (a request for more than a di­
rected verdict).79 Aetna's holding does not so bind the appellate court. 
In determining if there is no waiver, Aetna directs the appellate court 
to analyze the evidence on the record before the trial judge and the 
reasonableness of the parties' proof of their requests for more than a 
directed verdict.80 This appellate court discretion conflicts with the 
understanding of a conclusive presumption as an nonrebuttable rule of 
law.81 
The most appropriate match among the six presumption types 
therefore appears to be the mandatory burden-of-production-shifting 
presumption. That is, if the party (both litigation parties together) 
proves A (they each requested more than a directed verdict), then the 
71. Under the permissive inference, the factfinder may find the presumed fact B when 
the predicate fact A is considered along with all the evidence. Under the permissive 
presumption , the factfinder may find B even if A is the only evidence. Both presumptions 
ignore the opposing party's claims. 
72. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393-94. 
73. See supra note 49. 
74. See supra note 49. 
75. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393-94. 
76. See id. (stating that the trial judge's decision must stand "if the record discloses 
substantial evidence to support it , "  without reference to the persuasiveness of that evi­
dence). 
77. See supra note 51 . 
78. See supra note 52. 
79. See supra note 52. 
80. The parties' other requests "reasonably may be held to amount" to requests for 
more than a directed verdict. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393-94. 
81. See supra note 52. 
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factfinder (the appellate court) must find B (there was no waiver), 
unless the opposing party (the trial judge) introduces evidence suffi­
cient to prove B is not true.82 Here, the Supreme Court makes clear 
that the required sufficient evidence must be substantial; that is, there 
must be "substantial evidence" in the record supporting the trial 
court's finding.83 
In contrast, the concerns and facts prompting the Court arguably 
to create a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption in 
the Aetna context are materially different from those surrounding 
contractual jury trial waivers. In Aetna, there was no opposing party 
relying upon the first party's contractual promise; there was only the 
trial judge.84 Thus, the party-litigants' joint claim that they had not 
waived the right to a jury trial did not harm the expectations of the 
opposing party (there, the trial judge) in any way similar to a contrac­
tually bound party. The trial judge may have been harmed in that he 
sought to avoid jury trials in order to efficiently administer his court, 
but unlike a contract, there had been no consideration, no 
bargained-for exchange, and certainly no long-term reliance by the 
opposing party. 
When contractual jury trial waiver disputes are involved, therefore, 
one must reexamine the six presumption categories and find the most 
appropriate presumption that 1) upholds the fundamental right of jury 
trials, 2) protects the interests of parties to the contract, and 3) follows 
Aetna's instruction of indulging a "reasonable presumption."85 
With this in mind, the permissive presumption is the most appro­
priate.86 In the contractual waiver situation, if the party claims A (her 
82. See supra note 50. Recall under the mandatory burden-of-production-shifting 
presumption, sufficient evidence may be defined as any evidence, reasonable evidence, or 
substantial evidence. See also Aetna, 301 U.S. at 391-94. 
83. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393. 
84. Id. The appellate court was essentially deciding a "dispute" with the party-litigants 
on one side and the trial court judge on the other. 
85. Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added). 
86. See supra note 48. For the following, assume that A is the predicate fact (the waiver 
was not voluntary and knowing), and that B is the presumed fact (there was no waiver). See 
supra text accompanying notes 45-54. The other five presumptions catalogued in this Note 
do not fit the contractual jury trial waiver scenario nearly as well as the permissive presump­
tion. A permissive inference (if the party proves A, then the factfinder may find B when A is 
considered along with all evidence) allows the factfinder to conclude too easily that there 
was no jury trial waiver, given that any and all evidence may be used to reach that conclu­
sion. See supra note 47. The mandatory burden-of-pleading-shifting presumption (if the 
party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party claims B is not 
true), mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption (if the party proves A, then the 
factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party introduces evidence sufficient to prove B is 
not true), mandatory burden-of-persuasion-shifting presumption (if the party proves A, then 
the factfinder must find B, unless the opposing party persuades the factfinder that B is not 
true), and conclusive presumption (if the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B) 
are all too strong in the other direction. They all leave too little discretion for the factfinder 
to find against the party seeking to avoid the waiver if that party proves that the waiver was 
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waiver was not voluntary and knowing),87 then the factfinder may find 
B (there was no waiver) even if that party's claim of A is the only evi­
dence. First, the permissive presumption upholds the fundamental jury 
trial right. It allows the factfinder the freedom to find that there was 
no waiver even if the signing party can only claim her waiver was not 
voluntary and knowing, and is unable to offer other supporting evi­
dence.88 Second, the permissive presumption also protects the contrac­
tual interests of parties. By not shifting a burden to the party seeking 
to uphold the waiver while allowing the factfinder to find against the 
party seeking to avoid the waiver with weak evidence,89 the presump­
tion protects both parties' expectations.90 Finally, the permissive 
presumption is reasonable. It does not alter the normal mechanisms 
found in an ordinary contract dispute,91 yet it allows the factfinder the 
power to protect the notion of the jury trial. 
Aetna's reasonableness language also suggests that the evidence 
the waiver-signing party must furnish to prove her jury trial waiver 
was voluntary and knowing should be of a reasonable amount.92 To 
prove that neither party had limited its application to a motion for di­
rected verdict, the Supreme Court stated that the parties "submitted 
other requests that reasonably may be held to amount to applications" 
for more than directed verdicts.93 Applied to contractual jury trial 
waivers, the party claiming an invalid waiver must also submit evi­
dence that reasonably may be held to show a lack of voluntariness, 
knowledge, or intelligence with respect to the waiver signing. This 
relatively easy standard is tempered by the factfinder's discretion that 
she may, but need not, find that the plaintiff had not waived her right 
not voluntary and knowing. These remaining four presumptions therefore do not protect the 
expectations of the parties to the contract enough to satisfy the interests in freedom of 
contract recognized in this Note. See supra notes 49-52. 
87. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
88. Of course, a factfinder would likely (and probably correctly) find that there was a 
valid waiver if the signing party is unable to offer any supporting evidence to her claim that 
her waiver was not voluntary and knowing. 
89. For the amount of evidence required, see infra text accompanying notes 80-82. 
90. It is predicate evidence and contract common law that a party to a contract who 
seeks to void it expects to bear the burden of proving the contract is somehow invalid. See 29 
AM. JUR. 2o Evidence § 158 (1994) (the burden of proof "generally fall[s] upon the party 
seeking a change in the status quo, or upon the party that asserts the claim"). 
91. The party claiming that an enforceable contract exists bears the burden of proving 
formation (offer, acceptance, and consideration), see, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Paige, 193 F. Supp. 
2d 145, 152 (D.D.C. 2002), while the party challenging the contract under an affirmative 
defense bears the burden of proving that defense, see, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 
183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (unconscionability); Harrison v. Grobe, 790 F. Supp. 443, 
447 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (incapacity). 
92. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393-94 (1937). 
93. Id. (emphasis added). 
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to a jury trial.94 The court would (1) protect the fundamental right of 
jury trial by allowing reasonable evidence to void a waiver; (2) 
safeguard the liberty of contract and the opposing party's reliance on a 
bargained-for exchange by maintaining discretion to find in the 
waiver-seeking party's favor; and (3) indulge the most reasonable pre­
sumption in furtherance of Aetna's instructions. 
Applying Aetna in this manner shows that the Sixth Circuit 
properly declined to shift any burden of proof to the party seeking to 
uphold the waiver.95 On its face, Aetna appears to create a mandatory 
burden-of-production-shifting presumption, shifting the burden from 
the party seeking to avoid the waiver to the party seeking to uphold 
it.96 A closer examination of the facts and procedure, however, leads to 
a different conclusion. Aetna does not present a situation in which 
contractual duties are in effect. Thus, when Aetna's language requiring 
the indulgence of "every reasonable presumption" in favor of the jury 
trial right is applied to the contractual setting, it is clear that another 
type of presumption must be applied.97 Although the Sixth Circuit did 
not specifically analyze the presumption present in Aetna, but rather 
94. See supra note 48. 
95. See supra note 20. 
96. Aetna does so by concluding that the Seventh Amendment's jury trial right is 
fundamental. 301 U.S. at 393-94. At least one circuit , however, has found an exception to the 
jury trial right for complex cases. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 
(3d Cir. 1980). In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970), the Supreme Court recognized 
that the "Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather 
than the character of the overall action." The Court explained this statement in a footnote: 
"As our cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering ... the 
practical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. The Third Circuit relied upon this language 
to create an exception to the jury trial right for complex cases , stating that "(a] suit is too 
complex for a jury when circumstances render the jury unable to decide in a proper 
manner. " In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1079 (citing Schulz v. 
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956)); see also Douglas King, Comment, 
Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 581, 612 (1984). But see Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d 807, 814 (11th Cir. 1985); SRI Int'! 
v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Markay , C.J., joining 
with additional views); In re United States Fin. Secs. Litig. , 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Thus , the Seventh 
Amendment jury trial right may not be as fundamental as some courts have stated. The Ross 
complexity exception demonstrates that in the split over where the burden should be placed 
in contractual jury trial waiver disputes, the majority of courts, by shifting the burden to the 
party seeking to uphold the waiver, may be overconfident in their assessment of the funda­
mental nature of jury trials in federal civil cases. 
97. See Aetna, 301 U.S. at 393-94; see also supra note 86 for an explanation of why the 
five presumptions other than the permissive presumption do not fit the situation as pre­
sented in Aetna. 
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applied a presumption in favor of liberty of contract,98 the court at 
least reached the correct holding.99 
II. POLICY REASONS UNDERLIE A PERMISSIVE-PRESUMPTION 
INTERPRETATION OF AETNA 
In addition to the analysis of Aetna set forth above, two policy con­
siderations also support interpreting the presumption in Aetna as a 
perm1ss1ve presumption rather than a mandatory burden-of­
production-shifting presumption. First, FRCP 38's demand and waiver 
procedure is consistent with the permissive presumption. Second, 
courtroom and judicial system efficiency concerns support this reading 
of Aetna . 
A. FRCP 38's Bright-Line Demand and Waiver Rule 
For issues that may involve the jury trial right as protected by the 
Seventh Amendment,100 FRCP 38 creates a demand and waiver proce­
dure.101 As the Advisory Committee Notes from 1937 state, FRCP 38 
"provides for the preservation of the constitutional right of trial by 
jury."102 It makes "definite provision for claim and waiver of jury trial, 
following the method used in many American states and in England 
and the British Dominions."103 
FRCP 38 establishes a bright-line standard that places the demand 
burden on the party seeking a jury trial. Under this Rule, an individual 
is not entitled to a jury trial without a timely demand.104 In this sense, 
the Rule fixes a clear presumption against a jury trial and sets a 
bright-line standard for when the jury trial right attaches.105 
There is no reason why demanding a jury trial that has been 
actively waived should be procedurally different from the normal 
demand (and passive waiver) procedure in FRCP 38.106 When a party 
98. This presumption, found in MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, is as confusing as the 
one found in Aetna because it is not described in categorical terms. See supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. 
99. See supra note 29. 
100. See the description of the historical approach, supra text accompanying note 5. 
101. See supra note 7. 
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 38 advisory committee's notes. 
103. Id. 
104. See supra note 7. 
105. Note here how, in giving application to the jury trial right's fundamental nature, the 
facial reading of Aetna (establishing a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presump­
tion) is totally inconsistent with the demand and waiver policy established by FRCP 38. See 
supra text accompanying notes 65-83. 
106. At least one author would argue otherwise: 
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waives its right to a jury trial and then attempts to avoid that waiver 
(assumedly by arguing the waiver was somehow invalid), the party is 
essentially making a demand for a jury trial. There is no intelligible 
difference between demanding something that has yet to be granted 
and demanding something that has been relinquished.107 Under ordi­
nary FRCP 38 normal demand procedure,108 the individual seeking the 
jury trial has the burden of making a demand.109 Likewise, for an 
avoidance-of-waiver demand procedure, the burden of making the 
demand should remain on the party seeking the jury trial. This uni­
formity retains FRCP 38's recognition of the jury trial right's impor­
tance in the Constitution, honors each party's liberty to waive its jury 
trial right by contract, protects parties who have relied on contractual 
waivers, and remains consistent with the bright-line demand and 
waiver procedure established by the Rule. 
The policy behind this uniform structure also meshes well with the 
type of presumption argued for in this Note. Whereas the mandatory 
burden-of-production-shifting presumption,110 suggested by a superfi­
cial reading of Aetna,111 would require that the burden of production 
shift to the party opposing the jury trial demand, the permissive 
presumption,112 suggested by a more informed reading of Aetna,113 
would maintain the burden on the party demanding the jury trial. The 
Courts should not treat waivers made before litigation in the same way as waivers made 
when litigation has already begun. The issues and stakes are known in current litigation; in 
contrast, when a contract is signed far in advance of litigation, much uncertainty exists re­
garding problems that could occur "with respect to" the contract. 
See Matties, supra note 35, at 463 (citing Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broad. Inc., 843 F. 
Supp. 1379, 1388 (D. Nev. 1994), aff d, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion)). 
One can, however, make the opposite argument. When a contract is signed far in advance of 
litigation, the reliance interest of the opposing party is significantly greater than when the 
jury trial right is waived in the context of ongoing litigation. Protecting this interest would 
require courts to be more strict with early waivers than with late ones. In addition, whatever 
differences exist in what is known about the issues and stakes of the litigation are accounted 
for in requiring a waiver before litigation to be voluntary and knowing. See K.M.C. Co., Inc. 
v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985). 
107. This becomes even clearer when one compares how waiver occurs in the two situa­
tions. Under passive waiver, the jury-trial seeker waives his right by simple passage of time. 
Under active waiver, the jury-trial seeker has gone out of his way to waive his right. It is un­
clear, therefore, why waiver should be more difficult when active relinquishment occurs 
rather than mere passive resignation. 
108. Where a party demands her jury trial right either in her complaint or answer. See 
supra note 10. 
109. See supra note 7. 
110. To remind the reader: If the party proves A, then the factfinder must find B, unless 
the opposing party introduces evidence sufficient to prove B is not true. Sufficient evidence 
may be defined as any evidence, reasonable evidence, or substantial evidence. 
111. See supra Part I. 
112. To remind the reader: If the party proves A, then the factfinder may find B even if 
A is the only evidence. 
113. See supra Part I. 
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permissive presumption is more consistent with the policy of bright­
line demand and waiver present in FRCP 38.114 At the same time, the 
permissive presumption protects the fundamental nature of the jury 
trial right by allowing the factfinder to grant the party's demand based 
on little evidence that the waiver was not signed properly. 1 15 
B. Administrative Efficiency 
Allowing pre-litigation jury trial waivers and, in determining the 
legitimacy of those waivers, maintaining the burden on the party 
seeking to avoid a waiver permit judges to maximize courtroom effi­
ciency - one of the goals generally envisioned by the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.116 As judges seek to use most effectively their lim­
ited time and resources, they use rules and procedures such as FRCP 
38117 and various presumptions118 to administer their courts efficiently. 
Placing the burden on the party seeking a jury trial and defining 
waiver broadly to include "the failure of a party to serve and file a 
demand as required by this rule" allows the judge to quickly and easily 
decide whether a jury trial is or is not required.119 
Some critics argue that an inquiry into whether a contractual 
waiver has been properly signed would limit whatever efficiency gains 
would come from allowing pre-litigation jury trial waivers and placing 
the burden of proof on the party seeking to avoid such a waiver.120 
That is, in order to determine whether the jury trial right has been 
waived, the court must determine under a fact-intensive investigation 
whether the waiver was voluntary and knowing.121 This investigation, it 
is argued, would make whatever gains in efficiency from not having a 
jury insignificant. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. The permissive presumption looks only 
to the proof of demand or waiver supplied by the party seeking the jury trial, creating more 
of a bright-line rule than were the court required to shift a burden to the opposing party. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94. 
116. See Lujan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 912 (1990) (Blackmun, J .. 
dissenting) ("The District Court and today's majority fail to recognize the guiding principle 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the principle that procedural rules should be 
construed pragmatically, so as to ensure the just and efficient resolution of legal disputes."). 
117. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 , 756 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985) 
("Similarly, the rule respecting timely demand for trial by jury is a reasonable requirement 
calculated to insure the orderly presentation of the business of the court."). 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52. 
119. See supra note 7. 
120. See Matties, supra note 35, at 463 ("Because the standard by which contractual jury 
waivers are enforced always requires an intensive facts and circumstances inquiry. a 
presumption in favor of waiver does not affect the efficiency of trial courts." (footnotes 
omitted)). 
121. Nat'! Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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This argument fails for two reasons. First, it misunderstands the 
concept of efficient court administration. FRCP 38's simple demand 
and waiver provisions allow for efficient administration in two distinct 
ways. The demand procedure's simplicity and the bright-line determi­
nation of demand versus waiver allow for quick and simple judgments 
about whether a jury is required. More importantly, by easily allowing 
jury trial waivers, FRCP 38 decreases jury trial frequency. Cases tried 
by judges rather than juries consume less court time and fewer court 
resources.122 Applied to the contractual jury trial waiver setting, 
allowing for such simple waivers and maintaining the burden of 
demand on the party seeking the waiver makes jury trials less 
frequent, which again, allows for more efficiently administered 
courts.123 Second, the argument that an inquiry into the voluntary and 
knowing nature of the waiver would make efficiency gains insignifi­
cant fails because it does not take into account this Note's reading of 
Aetna as requiring only a permissive presumption in favor of jury 
trials.124 The permissive presumption allows the judge to find that the 
waiver was not signed properly if the party seeking to avoid the waiver 
claims as much.125 As argued in this Note, Aetna's reasonableness lan­
guage suggests that the evidence the signing party must furnish to 
prove her waiver was not voluntary and knowing is a reasonable 
amount.126 Thus, the inquiry into whether the waiver was voluntary 
and knowing will be rather restricted. Limiting the inquiry in this 
manner combined with maintaining the burden on the party seeking a 
jury trial would allow for efficiency in the same manner as ordinary 
FRCP 38 waivers, and would therefore not be insignificant. These effi-
122. That is, court proceedings are more streamlined when the court need not contend 
with a jury. To name a few examples, jury selection need not be conducted, jury instructions 
need not be given, and evidentiary hearings need not be held outside of the jury's ears. See, 
e.g. , Matter of Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1158 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[J]ury trials are, by na­
ture, more time consuming then [sic] bench trials . . . .  " (quoting In re G. Weeks Sec., Inc., 89 
B.R. 697, 710 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988))); BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), Societe 
Anonyme v. Khalil, 182 F.R.D. 335, 339 (D.D.C. 1998) (mem.) ("In other complex cases, 
real efficiencies can be had in trying the case to the Court rather than a jury because of the 
greater flexibility available in a bench trial."); Rosen v. Dick, 83 F.R.D. 540, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979) ("A bench trial always moves more expeditiously than a jury trial."). 
123. This can most easily be seen by comparing the ease of waiver under the two burden 
regimes discussed in this Note - shifting the burden to the party seeking to uphold the 
waiver, and maintaining the burden on the party seeking to void the waiver. Under the 
former, to waive its jury trial right, a party must sign the waiver and the party's opponent 
must then produce evidence that the waiver was voluntary and knowing. Under the latter, to 
waive its jury trial right, a party must simply sign the waiver. The extra burden placed on the 
opposing party in the burden-of-production-shifting regime clearly demonstrates that in the 
aggregate, waivers would be more frequent, hence jury trials less frequent, when the burden 
is not shifted and a permissive presumption is applied. 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. 
125. See supra note 48. 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94. 
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ciency goals weigh heavily in favor of this Note's limited reading of 
Aetna's presumption favoring jury trials.127 
CONCLUSION 
This Note analyzes two conflicting policy considerations in the 
context of federal court contractual jury trial waiver disputes: the 
fundamental nature of the jury trial versus the liberty of contract. 
When a party seeks to avoid a previously signed contractual jury trial 
waiver, an issue arises in these disputes as to who bears the burden of 
proving that waiver was not voluntary and knowing.128 The two 
conflicting policies just mentioned have led to opposing holdings 
regarding where that burden should be placed. Courts valuing the 
fundamental jury trial right over liberty of contract place the burden 
on the party seeking enforcement of the waiver,129 pointing to the 
Supreme Court's statement in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy that 
"as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver."13° Courts valuing the liberty 
of contract over the jury trial right place the burden on the party 
seeking to avoid enforcement,131 pointing to this value's endorsement 
by Moore's Federal Practice.132 
This Note argues that in balancing the fundamental right of jury 
trial with the liberty of contract, the burden of proof in contractual 
jury trial waiver disputes should not be shifted away from the party 
seeking to avoid the waiver to the party seeking to enforce the waiver. 
Several legal and policy arguments lead to this conclusion. First, an 
informed reading of Aetna demonstrates that the case did not require 
a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption, but rather a 
permissive presumption.133 Such a reading would allow a factfinder the 
freedom to find there was no waiver even if the signing party can only 
claim her waiver was not voluntary and knowing, but it is unable to 
offer any other supporting evidence, and would also protect the 
contractual expectations of both parties. Second, policy reasons, 
including judicial efficiency and procedural consistency with Federal 
127. This is not meant to pit efficiency against the fundamental importance of juries. 
Rather , this Note's reading of the Aetna presumption as a permissive presumption rather 
than a mandatory burden-of-production-shifting presumption is simply more consistent with 
the efficiency goal. 
128. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22. 
130. 301 U.S. at 393. 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. 
132. MOORE ET AL. , supra note 29. 
133. See supra Part I. 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 38's bright-line demand and waiver proce­
dure, support the conclusion that the burden should not be shifted.134 
134. See supra Part II. 
